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Does the anticipation of future shocks has a stabilizing eﬀect on the economy
and thus reduces the welfare loss compared to unanticipated shocks? In this
paper, we seek to answer this question by comparing the welfare eﬀects of
unanticipated and anticipated cost-push shocks in the canonical New Keynesian
model with a monetary authority which minimizes a standard loss function
that weights the volatility of inﬂation and the output gap. In particular, we
analytically solve for dynamics and welfare in case of optimal monetary policy
under timeless perspective commitment and discretion. We distinguish the
usual case of unanticipated cost-push shocks and the case of future cost-push
shocks that are known in advance.
Since the real business cycle revolution of Kydland and Prescott (1982)
and his successors, unanticipated random disturbances are considered as the
main driving force in explaining business cycles. New Keynesians add nominal
rigidities to the real business cycle framework to study the role of monetary
policy in aggregate ﬂuctuations but maintain the assumption of unpredictable
random shocks (see, e.g., the textbooks of Walsh (2003), Woodford (2003), or
Gal´ ı (2008)). An exception is the stream of literature that analyzes anticipated
disinﬂations going back to Ball (1994) who shows that a simple variant of the
New Keynesian model predicts a boom in response to an anticipated disinﬂa-
tion. However, the literature on the optimal design of monetary policy usually
considers unanticipated shocks (see, e.g. Clarida, Gal´ ı, and Gertler (1999),
Svensson (1999), King, Khan, and Wolman (2000), or Woodford (2003)).
Recently, a number of macroeconometric studies emphasize the role of antic-
ipated shocks as sources of macroeconomic ﬂuctuations. Beaudry and Portier
(2006) ﬁnd that more than half of business cycle ﬂuctuations are caused by
news about future technological opportunities. Davis (2007) and Fujiwara, Hi-
rose, and Shintani (2008) analyze the importance of anticipated shocks in large
scale DSGE models closely related to the model of Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Evans (2005) and report that these disturbances are important components of
aggregate ﬂuctuations. Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2008) conduct a Bayesian es-
timation of a real-business cycle model and ﬁnd that anticipated shocks are the
most important source of aggregate ﬂuctuations. In particular, they report that
anticipated shocks explain two thirds of the volatility in consumption, output,
investment, and employment.
Theoretical studies on the role of anticipations for business cycle ﬂuctuations
include Beaudry and Portier (2004, 2007), Beaudry, Collard, and Portier (2006),
Jaimovich and Rebelo (2006, 2008), Den Haan and Kaltenbrunner (2007), or
Christiano, Ilut, Motto, and Rostagno (2008).
However, none of these studies considers the welfare eﬀects of the antic-
ipation of future shocks. In this study, we derive a solution of welfare as a
function of the time span between the anticipation and the realization of the
shock which enables us to discover the dependency of welfare on the length of
the anticipation period. Furthermore, we contribute to the literature by sys-
tematically investigating the role of nominal rigidities for the welfare impacts
of anticipations.
1To the best of our knowledge, Wohltmann and Winkler (2008) and Winkler
(2008) are the only studies that compare the welfare eﬀects of anticipated and
unanticipated shocks. They both analyze energy price shocks under diﬀerent
monetary policy regimes including optimal monetary policy. However, these
studies rely on numerical simulations and do not, as we do, investigate the role
of nominal rigidities.
The main results of this paper are the following. For empirically plausible
degrees of nominal rigidity, the anticipation of a future cost-push shock leads
to a higher welfare loss than an analogous unanticipated shock. A welfare gain
from the anticipation of a future cost shock may only occur if prices are suﬃ-
ciently ﬂexible. This result is consistent with the ﬁndings of Schmitt-Groh´ e and
Uribe (2008) who show that the anticipation of future shocks has a stabilizing
eﬀect on an economy without nominal rigidities. We point out that precisely
the degree of nominal rigidity play an important role for the evaluation of the
welfare eﬀects of anticipations.
Our results are driven by two opposing eﬀects. On the one hand, we obtain
the well-known result that the anticipation of a future shock dampens its im-
pact eﬀect. On the other hand, we show that anticipation of future cost-push
shocks enhances the persistence of output and inﬂation and thus enhances the
welfare loss. This persistence eﬀect, in turn, is ampliﬁed by the degree of price
stickiness.
Nevertheless, at a ﬁrst glance, our ﬁndings seem to be puzzling since it
suggests that the information about the occurrence of future shocks is in general
welfare-reducing. But then the question arises, why rational agents do not
ignore the knowledge about future disturbances. In the remainder of this paper,
we will seek to shed more light on this question.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the canonical New
Keynesian model and its solution under the policy regimes timeless perspective
commitment and discretion. In section 3, we report and discuss our main ﬁnd-
ings. Furthermore, we provide analytical proofs and, for the sake of illustration,
numerical simulations. Section 4 concludes. The paper includes an extensive
mathematical appendix.
2 The Framework
The canonical New Keynesian model serves as analytical framework. It consists
of an optimizing IS-type relationship of the form
xt = Etxt+1 −
1
σ
(it − Etπt+1) (σ ≥ 1) (1)
and a price adjustment equation of Calvo-Rotemberg type, often referred to as
New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC)
πt = βEtπt+1 + κxt + kt (0 < β < 1,κ > 0) (2)
xt denotes the output gap, πt is inﬂation, and it is the nominal interest rate. Et
is the expectations operator conditional on information up to date t. β is the
2discount factor and 1/σ denotes the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
It is well-known that under the assumptions of Calvo (1983) price setting, a
constant returns to scale production function with labor as single input, and
perfect labor markets, the slope parameter κ is given by κ = (η+σ)
(1−ω)(1−βω)
ω ,
where η is the inverse of the labor supply elasticity.1 Obviously, κ is negatively
correlated with the degree of price rigidity ω. According to the Calvo price
adjustment mechanism, a fraction 1−ω of ﬁrms can adjust their price in period
t. Simultaneously, ω is the probability that a single price which is reoptimized
in period t, also holds in the next period t + 1. The Calvo parameter ω is
therefore a measure of the degree of price rigidity on the goods markets.
In the NKPC, kt represents a temporary cost-push shock that is assumed
to be autoregressive of order one with AR parameter ϕ ∈ [0,1) and a one-unit
cost shock εt
kt = ϕkt−1 + εt (t ≥ T > 0) (3)
Since we consider anticipated cost-push shocks, the one-unit cost shock εt is not
white noise, but known to the public before the shock actually occurs.2 Assume
that at time t = 0 the public anticipates the cost-push shock to take place at
some future time T > 0. Then,
εt =
 
1 for t = T > 0
0 for t  = T
(4)
The adjustment dynamics induced by anticipated shocks involve two phases,
the time span between the anticipation and the realization of the shock (0 ≤
t < T) and the time span after the implementation of the shock (T ≤ t ≤ ∞).
The lead time T up to the realization of the shock is equal to the length of the
anticipation phase 0 ≤ t < T. An implication of our deﬁnition of anticipated
shocks is that rational expectations are equivalent to perfect foresight so that
we can omit the expectations operator.
The policy maker’s objective at the time of anticipation t = 0 is to minimize






t) (α1 > α2 > 0, 0 < β ≤ 1) (5)
which reﬂects the objective of ﬂexible inﬂation targeting (see, e.g., Svensson
(1999)). Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) and Woodord (2003) show that,
under certain conditions, a quadratic loss function in inﬂation and the output
gap is the correct approximation to the representative agent’s utility function.
The ﬁrst-order conditions of the policy problem under timeless perspective
precommitment monetary policy as well as under discretion are well known and
1See, e.g., Walsh (2003) for a derivation of the NKPC under Calvo pricing.
2Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2007) study the impacts of anticipated cost shocks on the pass-
through to prices.
3need not to be derived here (see, for example, Walsh (2003)). Under the optimal




(xt − xt−1) (6)
while the output gap is described by the second-order diﬀerence equation
 








where the expectational operator can be omitted in case of anticipated shocks.






























The auxiliary variable wt is backward-looking (with the initial value w0 = 0,
while the output gap xt is forward-looking. The system matrix C has two real
eigenvalues r1 and r2 with r1 > 1 > r2 > 0 so that the Blanchard and Kahn
(1980) saddlepath stability condition is satisﬁed. A detailed derivation of our
results is provided in the mathematical appendix.











2 ) for t < T (10)







1 , x−1 = 0 (11)

















for t ≥ T
In the limiting case of unanticipated shocks (T = 0), the term in brackets in
equation (12) simpliﬁes to ϕt+1−rt+1
2 . Note that the solution formula (10) also
holds in the shock period t = T.












1 − (r2 − 1)rt
2
 
for t ≤ T (13)



















(1 − ϕ)ϕt−T −
(r1 − ϕ)r−T






for t ≥ T
In the limiting case T = 0, the term in brackets simpliﬁes to (1−ϕ)ϕt−(1−r2)rt
2.
To determine the welfare loss under the optimal precommitment policy,




















is the loss caused by the realization of the shock.











































The total loss V is then simply given by V = V1 + V2.
Under the policy regime discretion (D), the central bank is unable to make
a commitment to future policies. Now private expectations are given for the

















5with Etxt+1 = xt+1 in case of anticipated shocks. The diﬀerence equation in xt













α2 + α1κ2 
> 1 (23)














ϕt+s−T for t + s ≥ T
0 for t + s < T
(25)
we obtain for t ≥ T
xt = −
α1κ
α2 + α1κ2 − α2βϕ
ϕt−T (26)
and for t < T
xt = −
α1κ




D = 1 for t = T, the solution formula (27) also holds in the shock
period t = T. For t = 0 we obtain
x0 = −
α1κ
α2 + α1κ2 − α2βϕ
r−T
D (28)
so that the the size of the initial jump of xt decreases with increasing T.
For the inﬂation rate πt we obtain the solution time path
πt =

   
   
α2
α2 + α1κ2 − α2βϕ
rt−T
D if 0 ≤ t ≤ T
α2
α2 + α1κ2 − α2βϕ
ϕt−T if t ≥ T
(29)
Note that the limiting case ϕ = 0 implies πt = xt = 0 for t > T.
It is well-known that the loss under discretion (VD) is greater than the total
loss under the optimal precommitment policy. By inserting the solution time
paths for πt and xt in the loss function, we obtain
VD = V D
























































2β − (α2 + α1κ2)2 < 0 (31)
63 Main Results
In this section, we compare the welfare loss induced by anticipated shocks (T >
0) to the corresponding loss if the same deterministic shock is not anticipated
in advance (T = 0). In particular, we investigate the properties of the welfare
loss V considered as function of the lead time T.
Since the size of the initial jumps of the forward-looking variables xt and
πt are negatively correlated with the lead time T, we can conjecture that the
loss function V = V (T) is a decreasing function in T. In the following, we will
demonstrate that this conjecture is false in general. It is only true, if the degree
of price ﬂexibility is very high.
Our main results can be summarized in the form of four propositions.
Proposition 1. Without discounting (i.e. β = 1) the welfare loss induced by
an anticipated cost-push shock is greater than the corresponding loss in case of
an unanticipated shock. This result is independent of the length of the lead time
T and the degree of price rigidity ω:
If β = 1, then V (0) < V (T) for all T > 0 (32)
and all ω > 0.
A similar result holds with discounting (β < 1) provided the degree of
price rigidity ω is suﬃciently high and the time span between anticipation and
realization of the shock is not too large.
Proposition 2. If β is less than unity and the degree of price ﬂexibility 1 −
ω low, there exists a positive upper bound T∗
c for the lead time T, positively
depending on ω, such that
V (0) < V (T) for all 0 < T < T∗
c . (33)
Proposition 3. If the degree of price ﬂexibility is very high (i.e. ω very small)
then T∗
c = 0 so that
V (T) < V (0) for all T > 0. (34)
Only in this case (which seems empirically not very realistic), the welfare loss
under anticipated cost-push shocks is always smaller than under unanticipated
shocks.
Proposition 4. The propositions 1, 2, and 3 hold under the optimal monetary
policy regimes timeless perspective commitment and discretion. They also hold
under (optimal) simple rules of Taylor-type.
Sketch of Proof of Propositions 1, 2, and 3. Consider the partial loss func-
tion V1 (given by (18)) as function of T (the time span between the anticipation
and realization of the cost-push shock).
The function V1 = V1(T) has the following properties:




0 for β < 1





(r1 − ϕ)2(r1 − r2)2 (36)





2lnr1   r−2T
1 [r1 + r2 − 2] − (r1 − 1)ln(r1r2)   (r1r2)−T (37)











 T  
is positive at time T = 0:
dV1
dT










[lnr1 − lnr2] > 0 (38)
Therefore, V1(T) starts to rise with increasing T (although the size of the initial
jumps of xt and πt is decreasing in T). For β < 1, the limit value limT→∞ V1(T)
is equal to zero. Therefore, V1(T) must decrease if T is suﬃciently large.












0 if β < 1
V 2 > V2(0)





(r1 − ϕ)2(1 − ϕ2)






































implies for β < 1 and T = 0
dV2
dT







r1r2 − ϕ2 lnβ < 0 (43)
since β = 1/(r1r2). For β < 1, the derivative dV2/dT is also negative if T
is suﬃciently large. In the limiting case β = 1, the loss function V2(T) is an
increasing function in T with a limit value V 2 > V2(0).
We can now investigate the development of the total loss V = V1 + V2.
8In the limiting case β = 1, the total loss V (T) is an overall increasing















   
β=1
> 0 (44)
If β = 1, we can write V (T) as V1(T) + V2(T), where
V1(T) =
α1
(r1 − ϕ)2(r1 − r2)2
 
(r1 − 1) + (2 − r1 − r2)r−2T

































(r1 − ϕ)2(r1 − r2)2
 
2[r1 + r2 − 2]lnr1 (47)






1 > 0 for all T ≥ 0



























0 if T >
(=)
0
(because 0 < r2 < 1 < r1). Therefore, dV/dT > 0 for all T ≥ 0 so that V is a
monotonically increasing function in T. This result holds independently of the
degree of price rigidity ω.
For β < 1, V (0) = V2(0) > 0 (with V2(0) deﬁned in (39)) and limT→∞ V (T) =
0. For small values of ω, i.e. a high degree of price ﬂexibility, the total loss V
is a decreasing function in T implying V (T) < V (0) for all T > 0. With high
price ﬂexibility, the welfare loss under anticipated shocks is smaller than under
unanticipated shocks.











































1 − ϕ2 
lnβ > 0 (50)
9A rising ω induces a fall in the unstable eigenvalue r1 since dκ/dω < 0. Since
the fall in r2
1 is stronger than the decrease in lnr1, and 1/β−ϕ2 > 0, inequality
(50) is fulﬁlled if the degree of price rigidity ω is suﬃciently large. In this
case V (T) starts to rise and due to limT→∞ V (T) = 0 its development must
be hump-shaped implying the existence of an upper bound T∗
c > 0 such that
V (T) > V (0) > 0 for all T < T∗
c .
The value of the upper bound T∗
c is the positive solution of the equation









  r1(r1 − r2)
r1r2 − ϕ2 (51)



























= 1 − βϕ2 (53)
so that T∗
c is also the positive solution of (52) and (53). The value of T∗
c is de-
pendent on ω and β. A rising ω (a higher degree of price rigidity) decreases the
unstable eigenvalue r1 so that the left-hand side of equation (52) is decreased
while the right-hand side remains unchanged. Since βTr2T
1 = (r1/r2)T is in-
creasing in T, equation (52) implies that the solution value T∗
c must increase
if ω rises. Conversely, a higher degree of price ﬂexibility induces a fall in T∗
c .
For suﬃciently small values of ω, the only solution of (53) is T∗
c = 0 (so that
V (T) < V (0) for all T > 0). If a positive solution T∗
c of (53) exists, then it is
also an increasing function in the discount factor β with T∗
c = ∞ if β = 1.




[α2(1 − βϕ) + α1κ2]2
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> VD(0) > 0 if β = 1
(55)




[α2(1 − βϕ) + α1κ2]2
βT
1 − βϕ2 (56)
has the properties
V D









2 (T) < 0 if β < 1 for all 0 ≤ T < ∞ (59)
For β = 1, the function V D
2 (T) is constant (independent of T).
The partial loss function V D










has similar properties as the corresponding function V1(T) under the policy
regime timeless perspective commitment:
V D








0 if β < 1
α1α2[α2 + α1κ2]




> 0 if β = 1
(62)















is positive at time T = 0, since 1 − βr2
D < 0 and −2lnrD − lnβ < 0 due to
rD > 1 ≥ β.
In case β < 1, the development of V D
1 (T) is hump-shaped with the maximum
value at time T∗
d which is the solution of the equation
2(lnrD)r−2T
D + (lnβ)βT = 0 (64)


















The total loss function VD(T) = V D
1 (T)+V D
2 (T) has a similar development
as the corresponding function V (T) under timeless perspective commitment. In
the limiting case β = 1 it is overall increasing. For β < 1 it is hump-shaped, if
the degree of price ﬂexibility is not too large, while it is monotonically decreasing
in T if the value of ω is small. For small values of ω the derivative of VD at
time T = 0 is negative, while it is positive if ω is suﬃciently large. For the sake
of brevity, the proof for the case of simple (optimal) Taylor rules is presented
in the mathematical appendix.
11The propositions 1 to 3 follow from two opposing eﬀects on the welfare loss
which change in opposite directions with increasing lead time T. On the one
hand, the size of the initial jumps of the forward-looking variables xt and πt
taking place at the time of anticipation, is inversely related to the time span
between anticipation and realization of the cost-push shock. The longer the
lead time T, the smaller is the response of output and inﬂation on impact so
that the contribution of this anticipation eﬀect to the welfare loss V decreases
with increasing T. On the other hand, the persistence eﬀect of the cost-push
shock on the target variables xt and πt is increasing in T. Thereby, persistence
is measured as the total variation of a variable over time, i.e. its intertemporal
deviation from the respective initial steady state. For example, the persistence
of the price level pt is given by
 ∞
t=0 |pt −p0| where the initial steady state can
be normalized to zero. In the appendix, we derive the persistence of pt,xt, and
πt under the optimal monetary policy regimes commitment and discretion and
show that persistence is smaller in case of unanticipated shocks than in case of
anticipated shocks.
For the sake of illustration, we numerically simulated our solutions by using
a standard calibration. The time unit is one quarter. The discount rate is equal
to β = 0.99 implying an annual steady state real interest rate of approximately
4 percent. The inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, σ, is set
to σ = 2. We set η = 1 implying a quadratic disutility of labor. The Calvo
parameter ω is either set to 0.25 implying an average duration of price contracts
of four months or to 0.75 implying an average duration of price contracts of one
year. The weights in the loss function are set to α1 = 1 and α2 = 0.5 reﬂecting
the objective of ﬂexible inﬂation targeting. Finally, we assume the cost-push
shock to be persistent and choose ϕ equal to 0.5.
Figure 1 depicts impulse response functions of inﬂation, output gap, and
price level in case of low (ω = 0.25, left column) and high (ω = 0.75, right col-
umn) price rigidity under the optimal monetary policy with timeless perspective
commitment. Solid lines with triangles denote responses to a cost-push shock
that unexpectedly emerges in period t = 0, solid lines with circles denote re-
sponses to a cost-push shock whose realization in period T = 2 is anticipated
in period t = 0.
We ﬁrstly consider the empirically plausible case of high price rigidity. In
case of an unanticipated cost-shock, both the price level and inﬂation rise
whereas output falls in response to the realization of the increase in the costs
of production.3 Subsequently, all variables converge in a hump-shaped fashion
to their respective steady state values.
Anticipated cost shocks have two eﬀects, namely the anticipation eﬀect
which reﬂects the change in xt, πt, and pt in response to the anticipation of
a future change in costs, and the realization eﬀect which occurs when the an-
ticipated change in costs actually takes place. Under the optimal monetary
policy with commitment, output starts to decline and prices begin to increase
in response to the anticipation of a future rise in the costs of production. Both
3We could think about this cost-push shock as an exogenous rise in wage mark-ups (see, for
example, Gal´ ı (2008)).






















































Figure 1: Impulse response functions under optimal policy with timeless
perspective commitment.
Notes: Solid lines with triangles denote responses to an unanticipated
cost-push shock, solid lines with circles denote responses to an anticipated
cost-push shock. In case of low price rigidity, the Calvo parameter ω is set
to 0.25; in case of high price rigidity, ω is set to 0.75.
variables respond in a hump-shaped fashion peaking at the date of realization.
The increase in prices causes inﬂation to jump at the time of anticipation, peak-
ing at the date of realization and then returning in a hump-shaped fashion to
its initial steady state level.
In case of low price rigidity, an unanticipated cost shock causes an immediate
rise in prices and an immediate drop in output. Subsequently, both variables
converge monotonically to their initial steady state levels. After the initial
13jump, inﬂation falls sharply and converges from below to its pre-shock level.
The announcement of a future rise in costs has negligible anticipation eﬀects
when prices are highly ﬂexible. The reason is that the price setting problem of
ﬁrms becomes more of an atemporal (static) nature when the Calvo parameter
ω decreases. In this case ﬁrms know that, with a high probability, they will
be able to raise their price when the anticipated shock actually materializes
in period T. Thus, output and prices change only slightly in response to an
announcement or anticipation of future cost-push shocks.
Regardless of the degree of price rigidity, Figure 1 illustrates that the initial
jumps of inﬂation, output gap and price level are greater in case of unantic-
ipated (T = 0) than in case of anticipated shocks (T = 2). On the other
hand, anticipated shocks amplify the persistence of pt,xt, and πt compared to
unanticipated shocks.4




















Figure 2: Welfare loss for diﬀerent lengths of anticipation period under op-
timal timeless perspective commitment policy in case β = 1.
Figure 2 illustrates the welfare loss V = V (T) in case β = 1. Without time
discounting in the intertemporal loss function, the persistence eﬀect always
dominates the anticipation eﬀect so that proposition 1 holds. In Figure 2, the
total loss V = V (T) is overall increasing in T if β = 1.
If future deviations of the state variables from their initial steady state levels
are discounted, the contribution of the initial jumps of output and inﬂation for
the determination of the total loss becomes more important. The same holds for
increasing degree of price ﬂexibility 1−ω, since the persistence of prices, output
and inﬂation is a decreasing function of 1 − ω. If the degree of price ﬂexibility
is high, the value of the total loss is almost completely determined by the size
of the initial jumps of xt and πt which in turn is inversely proportional to the
lead time T. With a suﬃciently high degree of price ﬂexibility, the total loss
under unanticipated cost-push shocks is greater than the loss under anticipated
shocks so that proposition 3 holds. This result is also illustrated in Figure 3,
where V (T) is a monotonically decreasing function in the lead time T if the
degree of price rigidity ω is very small.
4This result also holds in the special case ϕ = 0, i.e. if the shock exhibits no serial correlation.
It is well-known that even in this case the optimal precommitment policy introduces inertia
in the impulse response functions.



















Figure 3: Welfare loss for diﬀerent lengths of anticipation period under op-
timal timeless perspective commitment policy in case β = 0.99.
From an empirical point of view, the parameter ω is not that small so that
the development of the impulse response functions displays inertia or strong
serial correlation. Then, if the time span between the anticipation and the
implementation of the cost-push shock is not too long, the persistence eﬀect
dominates and the value of the total loss V (T) is greater than V (0). This
is illustrated in Figure 3, where the development of the loss function V (T) is
hump-shaped and monotonically increasing for small values of T.
Propositions 1 to 3 are independent of the chosen optimal monetary policy
regime. They hold under timeless perspective commitment as well as under
discretion (see Figure 4 and 5 for a numerical visualization). They also hold
under simple monetary policy rules (such as Taylor-type rules or money growth
peg).























Figure 4: Welfare loss for diﬀerent lengths of anticipation period under the
optimal discretionary policy in case β = 1.
In order to check whether the welfare-reducing eﬀects of anticipations hold
for empirically plausible degrees of nominal rigidity, we compute the critical
anticipation values T∗
c (commitment) and T∗
d (discretion). Table 1 depicts the
values of T∗
c and T∗
d for a persistent (ϕ = 0.5) and a one-oﬀ cost-push shock
(ϕ = 0).
Table 1 shows that the anticipation of cost-push shocks dampens the welfare
loss induced by such shocks only for empirically unrealistic degrees of nominal

























Figure 5: Welfare loss for diﬀerent lengths of anticipation period under the
optimal discretionary policy in case β = 0.99.
rigidity. For the widely applied values of ω = 0.75 or ω = 0.66, the anticipation
period or lead time T must be extremely large to obtain a welfare gain from
anticipation. Under commitment and a value ω = 0.75, the loss under an
anticipated shock is smaller than the loss under an unanticipated shock of same
size when the shock is anticipated to take place in T∗
c = 54 (for ϕ = 0.5) or
T∗
c = 66 (for ϕ = 0) quarters. Even larger values are obtained under optimal
discretionary policy. A Calvo parameter of 0.5 represents the lower bound
in the range of values that are reported in the literature. In this case and
under the monetary policy regime commitment, the anticipation of future cost
shocks has a welfare-enhancing eﬀect if the lead time is larger or equal to two
quarters for persistent and three quarters for one-oﬀ shocks, respectively. Under
discretionary monetary policy, these critical values are three and four quarters.
Our simulations illustrate that for a wide range of empirically realistic de-
grees of nominal rigidities (i.e., ω ≥ 0.5) in conjunction with a plausible length
of the anticipation period, the welfare loss of anticipated cost shocks exceeds
the welfare loss of unanticipated cost shocks.
Table 1: Values of the critical lead time T ∗
c and T ∗
d
Degree of price rigidity ω
Monetary policy 0.75 0.66 0.60 0.55 0.50 0.45 0.40 0.25
With ϕ = 0.5
Commitment 53.09 19.82 9.00 4.23 1.82 0.69 0.16 0
Discretion 125.90 40.41 15.61 6.37 2.42 0 0 0
With ϕ = 0
Commitment 65.78 25.57 11.79 5.59 2.41 0.95 0.28 0
Discretion 146.99 50.77 20.25 8.38 3.20 0 0 0
Note: For an anticipation period 0 < T < T
∗
i it is true that V |T > V |T=0, for T > T
∗
i it is
true that V |T < V |T=0 where i = c,d.
164 Conclusion
In this paper we investigate the welfare eﬀects resulting from the anticipation of
future shocks. In particular, we analyze the welfare loss for diﬀerent lengths of
the time span between the anticipation and the realization of cost-push shocks.
This includes the widely applied case of unanticipated cost-push shocks. Our
analysis is based on the canonical New Keynesian model with optimal monetary
policy.
We emphasize the role of nominal rigidities for the welfare eﬀects of an-
ticipations. We show that for empirically plausible degrees of nominal rigidity,
anticipated cost shocks entail higher welfare losses than unexpected cost shocks.
The anticipation of a future cost-push shock dampens the volatility of output
and inﬂation only if prices are highly ﬂexible. These results hold independently
of the monetary policy regime (timeless perspective commitment, discretion,
(optimal) simple rules).
Our results imply that the knowledge about the realization of future cost
shocks is in general welfare-reducing. The question remains why rational agents
do not simply ignore this information. However, this would be inconsistent with
the proﬁt-maximizing behavior of individual ﬁrms and the utility-maximizing
behavior of individual households on which our model is based. The ﬁrm’s
optimality condition in fact calls for an increase in prices in response to the
anticipation of a future rise in costs. By simply ignoring this information, the
ﬁrm would make a loss.
Hence, our results reveal a contradiction between the optimal behavior of
individuals and the optimum from a social point of view.
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19Mathematical Appendix
Solution time paths under the optimal timeless perspective pre-
commitment policy
It is well-known that under the optimal timeless perspective precommitment




(xt − xt−1) (1)
and
 








where the expectational operator can be omitted in case of anticipated shocks.






























The auxiliary variable wt is backward-looking (with the initial value w0 = 0)
while the output gap xt is forward-looking. The system matrix C has two real
eigenvalues r1 and r2 with r1 > 1 > r2 > 0 so that the Blanchard/Kahn (1980)






















We can transfer system (3) into Jordan-canonical form using the similarity
transformation
C = H   Λ   H−1 (7)
where Λ = diag(r1,r2) is a diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements are the







20is a matrix of linearly independent eigenvectors of C. Deﬁne auxiliary variables













































The diﬀerence equation in vt contains the unstable eigenvalue r1 and has the













Since the cost-push shock kt+s is a AR(1) variable with
kt+s =
 
ϕt+s−T for t + s ≥ T























1 for t ≤ T
(13)









1 < 0 (14)












where the constant K follows from the initial condition
z0 = K = w0 − v0 = −v0 (16)














































for t ≥ T











2 ) for t ≤ T (19)

























for t ≥ T
The solution formula (21) also contains the limiting case T = 0, i.e., if the
cost-push shock is not anticipated. The term in brackets then simpliﬁes to
ϕt+1 − rt+1
2 .












1 − (r2 − 1)rt
2
 
for t ≤ T (22)



















(1 − ϕ)ϕt−T −
(r1 − ϕ)r−T






for t ≥ T
In the special case T = 0 the term in brackets simpliﬁes to (1−ϕ)ϕt−(1−r2)rt
2.
The solution time path of the price level pt can be derived from the solution


























































































(1 − ϕ)ϕk−T −
(r1 − ϕ)r−T



































































1 − ϕt+1−T +
(r1 − ϕ)r−T













































1 = π0 > 0 (29)
so that the size of the initial jump in p is inversely proportional to the lead time
T.
Similar results hold for the state variables xt and πt. Since
t  
k=0














so that pt > 0 if and only if xt < 0. The optimal policy under timeless perspec-
tive implies pt > 0 for all 0 ≤ t < ∞ so that xt < 0 for all t < ∞. We can also












   
 
T>0
for all T > 0 (32)




   
T>0
is an increasing function in T.
The persistence measure used here is based on the deviation of pt from its
initial steady state level p0, where the deviation |pt − p0| is calculated both for
t < T and t ≥ T. Thereafter the diﬀerences |pt − p0| are summed up. Since
p0 = 0 and pt > 0 for all t we must determine the inﬁnite sum
 ∞
t=0 pt.
Inequality (32) holds although the initial jump of pt is a negative function

















































































































































































1 − r2  
1


















[ϕ − 1] > 0 ⇔
1





































β(r1 − ϕ)(r2 − ϕ)
ϕ > 0 ⇔
1















β(r1 − ϕ)(r2 − ϕ)(r1 − r2)
 
 [r2(r1 − ϕ) − (r1 − r2) − (r2 − ϕ)r1] +
1
β(r1 − ϕ)(r2 − ϕ)
ϕ > 0 ⇔
1













(1 − r2)(r1 − r2)











β(r1 − ϕ)(r2 − ϕ)
(r1 − r2)(ϕ − r2)
(1 − r2)(r1 − r2)
> 0 ⇔
1







β(r1 − ϕ)(1 − r2)
> 0 ⇔
r1 − r−T
1 − (r1 − 1) > 0 ⇔
1 − r−T
1 > 0




   
 
T>0
is an increasing function in T. This follows from equation




1 with respect to T is positive.




















The persistence of the output response in case of anticipated cost-push shocks
is therefore stronger than in case of unanticipated shocks.
A similar result can be shown for the inﬂation rate πt if the limiting case
ϕ = 0 is considered. We then get for T = 0
πt =
 
1 − (1 − r2) = r2 if t = 0
−(1 − r2)rt





πt = π0 +
∞  
t=1

















   
T=ϕ=0




2 = 2r2 (42)
In case T > 0 and ϕ = 0 we get





























































































































































The case ϕ > 0 is more diﬃcult to analyze since πt can take both positive and




β(r1 − ϕ)(r2 − ϕ)
 
(1 − ϕ)ϕt − (1 − r2)rt
2
 













































β(r1 − ϕ)(r2 − ϕ)




































































(since r1 > 1 > r2 > 0). If t > T, πt is negative for suﬃciently large values of
t. For small values of t > T πt may be positive. Due to
lim
t→∞














πt < 0 (58)
The last equation also follows from (24): With
ψ = −
(r1 − ϕ)r−T























β(r1 − ϕ)(r2 − ϕ)
 
(1 − ϕ)ϕ−T ϕT+1
1 − ϕ








































β(r1 − ϕ)(r2 − ϕ)(r1 − r2)
 






β(r1 − ϕ)(r2 − ϕ)(r1 − r2)
 




























































































































































Note that for arbitrary T > 0
π0
 
















   
 
T=0
for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T (65)
In particular
πT


























β(r1 − ϕ)(r1 − r2)
 







































Since the last equation holds, the value of the inﬂation rate at the time of
implementation of the cost-push shock is smaller in case of anticipated compared
to unanticipated shocks.5
5This result holds under the optimal timeless perspective precommitment policy. Under the
policy regime discretion we have (cf. (138))
π0
 








α2 + α1κ2 − α2βϕ
30The loss under the optimal policy
To determine the welfare loss under the optimal precommitment policy, write




















is the loss following from the realization of the shock. We ﬁrst calculate the
value of the loss function V1. Since the solution time path of the state vector

































































































































































































According to (6) we have


















+ 1 − (r1 + r2) =


































Using (6) we get































































(1 − r2) (85)

















Consider V1 as function in T (the time span between the anticipation and real-
ization of the cost-push shock). The function V1(T) has the following properties:




0 for β < 1





(r1 − ϕ)2(r1 − r2)2 (88)





2lnr1   r−2T
1 [r1 + r2 − 2] − (r1 − 1)ln(r1r2)   (r1r2)−T (89)



















2(lnr1)(r1 + r2 − 2) (90)














[lnr1 − lnr2] > 0
Therefore, V1(T) starts to rise with increasing T (although the size of the initial
jumps of xt and πt is decreasing in T). For β < 1 the limit value is equal to
zero, therefore V1(T) must decrease if T is suﬃciently large. Figure 6 illustrates
the hump-shaped development of V1(T) in case β < 1.
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Figure 6: Partial loss in the anticipation phase for diﬀerent lengths of antic-
ipation period under optimal timeless perspective commitment policy in case
β = 0.99.
























































































































































34The elements of the symmetric matrix Q are given by
q11 = α1δ2ϕ−2T
 






q12 = α1δ2φϕ−T 1
r1 − r2
 






q22 = α1δ2φ2 1
(r1 − r2)2
 

















φ = (r2 − ϕ)r−T
1 − (r1 − ϕ)r−T
2 (100)









































































































































Using (6) and the deﬁnition of qij we can write
w
(2)
11 = α1δ2 βT
1 − βϕ2
 

































































































2 (1 − r2) +
φ2
(r1 − r2)2r2T






r1r2(1 − 2ϕ) + (r1 + r2 − 1)ϕ2 
= 1 +
(r1 + r2)ϕ − 2r1r2
r1r2 − ϕ2 ϕ (111)





















(1 − r2) + r2 +
(r1 + r2)ϕ − 2r1r2











































0 if β < 1
V 2 > V2(0)





(r1 − ϕ)2(1 − ϕ2)





































implies for β < 1
dV2
dT







r1r2 − ϕ2 lnβ < 0 (118)
(since β = 1/(r1r2)). For β < 1, dV2/dT is also negative if T is suﬃciently
large. Figure 7 illustrates that the development of V2 is overall decreasing if
the value of ω is suﬃciently small (i.e., the degree of price ﬂexibility is high);
otherwise it is not monotone, but hump-shaped. For suﬃciently large values of
ω the loss function V2 has two extrema (a maximum and a minimum) which can
be determined from the ﬁrst-order condition dV2/dT = 0. The ﬁrst extremum
of V2 cannot be represented graphically since the corresponding value of T is
very small. Note that in the limiting case β = 1 the loss function V2(T) is an
increasing function in T with a limit value V 2 > V2(0).
We can now derive the development of the total loss V = V1 + V2. We
ﬁrst assume β < 1. Then V (0) = V2(0) > 0 (with V2(0) deﬁned in (114)) and
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Figure 7: Partial loss in the implementation phase for diﬀerent lengths of
anticipation period under optimal timeless perspective commitment policy in
case β = 0.99.
limT→∞ V (T) = 0. For small values of ω, i.e. a high degree of price ﬂexibility,
the total loss V is a decreasing function in T implying V (T) < V (0) for all
T > 0. With high price ﬂexibility the welfare loss under anticipated shocks is
smaller than under unanticipated shocks. If ω is small, the persistence of the
state variables is weak and the total loss is mainly determined by the size of
the initial jumps of xt and πt which is a decreasing function in T. By contrast,
for suﬃciently large values of ω (i.e. a high degree of price rigidity) the jump
variables xt and πt display a strong persistence so that the welfare loss starts
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T=0
> 0 ⇔ (120)
 




1 − ϕ2 










1 − ϕ2 
lnβ > 0
The last equivalence holds since lnr2 = −(lnr1+lnβ). A rising ω induces a fall
in the unstable eigenvalue r1 since dκ/dω < 0. Since the fall in r2
1 is stronger
than the decrease in lnr1, and 1/β − ϕ2 > 0, inequality (120) is fulﬁlled if ω is
suﬃciently large. In this case V (T) starts to rise and due to limT→∞ V (T) = 0
38its development must be hump-shaped implying the existence of an upper bound
T∗
c > 0 such that V (T) > V (0) for all T < T∗
c .
With low price ﬂexibility and a lead time T which is not too long, the welfare
loss under anticipated shocks is greater than under unanticipated shocks. The
reason is the stronger persistence of xt and πt in case T > 0 (compared to
T = 0) which dominates the determination of the total loss if ω is suﬃciently
large.
The value of the upper bound T∗
c is the positive solution of the equation





















1 − βT  r1
r1r2 − ϕ2









  r1(r1 − r2)
r1r2 − ϕ2 (122)


























































1 − ϕ2 
+
1
βT (1 − βr2
1)
 



























= 1 − βϕ2 (124)
so that T∗
c is also the positive solution of (123) and (124). The value of T∗
c is
dependent on ω and β. A rising ω (a higher degree of price rigidity) decreases
the unstable eigenvalue r1 so that the left-hand side of equation (123) is de-
creased while the right-hand side remains unchanged. Since βTr2T
1 = (r1/r2)T
is increasing in T, equation (123) implies that the solution value T∗
c must in-
crease if ω rises. Conversely, a higher degree of price ﬂexibility induces a fall in
T∗
c . For suﬃciently small values of ω the only solution of (124) is T∗
c = 0 (so
that V (T) < V (0) for all T > 0). If a positive solution T∗
c of (124) exists, then
it is also an increasing function in the discount factor β with T∗
c = ∞ if β = 1.
39In the limiting case β = 1 the total loss V (T) is an overall increasing function


















If β = 1, we can write V (T) as V1(T) + V2(T), where
V1(T) =
α1
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(r1 − 1) + (2 − r1 − r2)r−2T














































(r1 − ϕ)2(r1 − r2)2
 
2[r1 + r2 − 2]lnr1 (128)






1 > 0 for all T ≥ 0



























0 if T >
(=)
0
(because 0 < r2 < 1 < r1). Therefore, dV/dT > 0 for all T ≥ 0 so that V is a
monotonically increasing function in T. This result holds independently of the
degree of price rigidity ω.
Optimal policy under discretion
Under the policy regime discretion (D), the central bank is unable to make
a commitment to future policies. Now private expectations are given for the


















40with Etxt+1 = xt+1 in case of anticipated shocks. The diﬀerence equation in xt













α2 + α1κ2 
> 1 (132)














ϕt+s−T for t + s ≥ T
0 for t + s < T
(134)

























α2 + α1κ2 − α2βϕ
ϕt−T





































D = 1 for t = T, the solution formula for xt also holds in the shock
period t = T. For t = 0 we get
x0 = −
α1κ
α2 + α1κ2 − α2βϕ
r−T
D (137)
so that the the size of the initial jump of xt decreases with increasing T.
For the inﬂation rate πt we obtain the solution time path
πt =

   
   
α2
α2 + α1κ2 − α2βϕ
rt−T
D if 0 ≤ t ≤ T
α2
α2 + α1κ2 − α2βϕ
ϕt−T if t ≥ T
(138)
Note that the limiting case ϕ = 0 implies πt = xt = 0 for t > T.
For all 0 ≤ ϕ < 1 the adjustment processes of xt and πt in case of anticipated










































































   
T=0
since rD > 1 and 0 < r−T
D < 1 if T > 0. An analogous result holds for xt.



























   
T>0
(143)
so that the stronger persistence of πt and xt in case T > 0 is due to the
anticipation eﬀects
 T−1
t=0 πt > 0 and
 T−1
t=0 xt < 0.





For 0 ≤ t ≤ T we get
pt =
α2
















































Note that the limit value of pt is a positive function in T. It is well-known that
a temporary cost-push shock yields a permanent rise in the price level under the
policy regime discretion. By contrast, under the optimal timeless perspective
precommitment policy there is only a temporary rise in the price level.
A further well-known result is that the loss under discretion (VD) is greater
than the total loss under the optimal precommitment policy. Inserting the























t = V D






















































































2β − (α2 + α1κ2)2 < 0 (149)
Consider VD as function in T. Then
VD(0) =
α1α2[α2 + α1κ2]
[α2(1 − βϕ) + α1κ2]2
1





















[α2(1 − βϕ) + α1κ2]2
βT
1 − βϕ2 (152)
43has the properties
V D









2 (T) < 0 if β < 1 for all 0 ≤ T < ∞ (155)
For β = 1 the function V D
2 (T) is constant.
The loss function V D










has similar properties as the corresponding function V1(T) under the policy
regime commitment:
V D








0 if β < 1
α1α2[α2 + α1κ2]




> 0 if β = 1
(158)















is positive at time T = 0, since 1 − βr2
D < 0 and −2lnrD − lnβ < 0 due to
rD > 1 ≥ β.
In case β < 1 the development of V D
1 (T) is hump-shaped with the maximum
value at time T∗
d which is the solution of the equation
2(lnrD)r−2T
D + (lnβ)βT = 0 (160)


















The total loss function VD(T) = V D
1 (T)+V D
2 (T) has a similar development
as the corresponding function V (T) under timeless perspective commitment.
In the limiting case β = 1 it is overall increasing while for β < 1 it is hump-
shaped, if the degree of price ﬂexibility is not too large, while it is monotonically
decreasing in T if the value of ω is small. For small values of ω the derivative
of VD at time T = 0 is negative, while it is positive if ω is suﬃciently large.
44Total loss under a simple rule
We can also determine the total loss under an ad hoc Taylor rule
it = δππt + δxxt (163)
with exogenously given coeﬃcients δπ and δx. It is well-known that under the
condition δπ > 1 and δx ≥ 0 the baseline New Keynesian model satisﬁes the

































have two unstable eigenvalues belonging to the state matrix A−1B. Solving the












the solution time paths in case of anticipated cost-push shocks:







B−1qϕt−T = −[I2×2 − ϕP]−1B−1qϕt−T (167)
= −[B − ϕA]−1qϕt−T








= −[I2×2 − ϕP]−1(ϕP)T−tB−1qϕt−T
= −[I2×2 − ϕP]−1PT−t B−1q
The solution formula for t < T also holds in t = T since
vT = −[B − ϕA]−1q (169)
= −[I2×2 − ϕP]−1B−1










vt = V STR




















































































21 α2m11m12 + α1m21m22

























The deﬁnition of the matrices A and B implies
B − ϕA =
 
1 + δx




−κ 1 − ϕβ
 
(178)




















b = (1 − ϕ)(1 − ϕβ)σ + δx(1 − ϕβ) + κ(δπ − ϕ) (180)
> 0 if δπ > 1 and δx > 0
Then




σ(1 − ϕβ) −(δπ − ϕ)







(δπ − ϕ), m22 =
1
b









α2(δπ − ϕ)2 + α1(σ(1 − ϕ) + δx)2 
(183)
The loss function V STR
2 = V STR
2 (T) hat the same properties as the correspond-
ing function under discretion (V D
2 (T)).
To calculate the loss V STR
1 set
Q = [I2×2 − ϕP]−1 (where P = B−1A) (184)
and
˜ q = B−1q (185)
Then
vt = −QPT−t˜ q for t ≤ T (186)
and
V STR
























= βT ˜ q′ ˜ W ˜ q = βTtr( ˜ W ˜ q˜ q′)
where








(σ + δx + κδπ)2
 
δ2
π −δπ(σ + δx)












˜ W satisﬁes the following matrix equation: Let






Then the deﬁnition of ˜ W implies
˜ W = β−1P′ ˜ DP +
T  
k=2
β−k(Pk)′ ˜ DPk (191)

















P − β−1P′β−T(PT)′ ˜ DPTP
= β−1P′ ˜ DP − β−(T+1)(PT+1)′ ˜ DPT+1 + β−1P′ ˜ WP
or in compact representation
˜ W = ˜ H + β−1P′ ˜ WP (192)
where
˜ H = β−1P′ ˜ DP − β−(T+1)(PT+1)′ ˜ DPT+1 (193)
To solve for ˜ W use the vectorization of a matrix and the Kronecker product of
matrices. Since
vec(β−1P′ ˜ WP) = [β−1P′ ⊗ P′]vec ˜ W (194)
we obtain
vec ˜ W − [β−1P′ ⊗ P′]vec ˜ W = vec ˜ H (195)
with the solution
vec ˜ W = [I4×4 − β−1P′ ⊗ P′]−1vec ˜ H (196)
where
vec ˜ H = vec(β−1P′ ˜ DP) − vec(β−(T+1)(PT+1)′ ˜ DPT+1) (197)
=
 




























in the special case ϕ = 0. The devel-
opment of V STR
1 as function in T is analogous to the loss function V D
1 (T).
Therefore, the total loss function V STR(T) = V STR
1 (T) + V STR
2 (T) has the
same properties as the total loss under discretion.
49